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WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1976-1977
MINERAL RIGHTS
Frederick W. Ellis*
LEASE TERMINATION AND CANCELLATION CLAIMS
In Huhn v. Marshall Exploration, Inc., I the supreme court held that
the setting up of a rig and drilling a cement plug of an old well on the last
day pf a primary term constituted "drilling operations" which maintained
an oil and gas lease beyond the primary term. The Huhn decision also
involved several other unsuccessful efforts to cancel a lease, employing
various theories of lease clauses. Force majeure was recognized as includ-
ing vandalism which was "beyond the control of lessee." 2 Thus failure to
produce caused by vandalism did not terminate the lease under the haben-
dum clause. Delays in production royalty payments were not an active
breach of the lease, under the facts of the case.3 Similarly, delays in shut in
payments, under a 14BR 1-Bath lease form (which treats shut in payments
as royalties) were not sufficient to warrant cancellation.
In the Huhn opinion, the court ignored the Mineral Code,' but the
results of the decision would not have been changed by its use. By the
analysis of the court, problems of retrospective application of the Mineral
Code, discussed hereinafter, were made moot. Relevant Mineral Code
provisions should, however, be considered by anyone hereafter employing
the case as precedent. 5
Notwithstanding the nonuse of the Mineral Code, the case has some
importance to supplement the code. In treating a force majeure problem, it
furnishes a precedent on a matter not explicitly covered by the Mineral
Code. In summarizing the pre-code jurisprudence, the opinion distilled
several factors which determine whether an active breach of a lease has
occurred due to delay or nonpayment of rent.6 The case may also portend
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 337 So. 2d 561 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 339 So. 2d 854 (La. 1976).
2. Id. at 564.
3. Id. at 564-66.
4. LA. R.S. 31.:1-214 (Supp. 1974).
5. See, e.g., id. 31:137-141 (Supp. 1974) on notice and other rules governing
the consequence of delay in payment of royalty.
6. 337 So. 2d at 566. These factors were said to include: (1) length of time; (2)
amount of royalties; (3) special circumstances outside of a lessee's control; (4)
19781
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
continued significance of the active breach doctrine for limited purposes
still imaginable under the Mineral Code. 7
SERVITUDE Co-OWNER LESSEES-RIGHTS OF OPERATION;
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE MINERAL CODE
The Second Circuit Court of Appeal, in GMB Gas Corp. v. Cox,8
obliquely faced the issue of retroactive application of the Mineral Code by
judicially adopting a rule of the Mineral Code to cover a pre-code question
not theretofore decided by the jurisprudence. The basis of decision was
that although the prior jurisprudence had not squarely decided the exact
factual question at bar, concerning the power of a lessee of a co-owner of a
single mineral servitude, a policy of maintaining stability in the law called
for an interpretation of prior law consistent with those adopted by the
legislature.
Allowing new legislation to control interpretations of prior law is a
delicate matter. It is possible to demonstrate that within limits there is
theoretical justification in civilian theory for giving weight to legislative
interpretation of prior law. However, continental civilians operating in
parliamentary systems never had to worry about American constitutional
restraints on the power of the legislature. If the legislature may too freely
interpret prior law, then the old adage that no man's life or property is safe
while the legislature is in session would be a serious reality.
An inquiry into the meaning of the old law should be guided by
article 1 of the Civil Code which states, "Law is the solemn expression of
the legislative will." Therefore, in seeking to ascertain whether new law
has destroyed rights under old law, courts must do more than merely
examine whether there is a four square case in point. Rights long estab-
lished under the Civil Code or legislation are often so clearly vested that
there is no need for controversy or litigation. Legislation, as much as any
case, indeed more so than any case, can vest rights. Therefore, future
decisions ought to analyze Civil Code regimes antedating the Mineral
Code, irrespective of jurisprudence or the absence thereof.
This is not to say that every right afforded by legislation creates a
vested right and cannot be legislatively changed. It is to say, however, that
the determination of whether rights previously existed should involve an
analysis of relevant legislation, not merely whether a case treated the
motive of lessee; (5) circumstances of lessor inquiry or demands; (6) equality or
inequality of the lessor and lessee, as to knowledge about the industry.
7. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 31:135-140 (Supp. 1974).
8. 340 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
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point. The question of the vested or nonvested character of the right is a
separable matter.
Turning to the particular substantive results of the GMB decision,
one may question whether the prior jurisprudence pertaining to co-owners
of land should have been extended to co-owners of a mineral servitude. It
is also doubtful whether parties who intended a co-ownership mineral
servitude status and who reserved mineral rights in a partition of land were
truly co-owners of a mineral servitude. 9 However, the court employed
articles 175, 176, 66 and 67 of the Mineral Code' ° to hold that such a
partition created a single mineral servitude and a co-ownership, and that
there was no independent right of operation by a co-owner or his lessee.
Judge Marvin, in a concurring opinion, was somewhat bothered by
apparent inconsistencies in the law of co-ownership as suggested by the
comment to article 175. He also noted other inconsistencies in commen-
tary material. His concern is justified. The problems could be clarified by
an exposition of the legislative history, which warrants fuller analysis in a
separate article. Let it be briefly noted now, however, that the original
proposal of the Reporter for the Mineral Code, to recognize an indepen-
dent right of operation among all co-owners, was rejected." Original
commentary supporting the rejected proposal was carried over into the
unofficial comments explaining the substitute enactments. The comments
are not official and should be cautiously read in subject matter areas, such
as co-ownership, where final versions were opposite to original proposals.
STATE DIVESTITURE OF MINERALS
Both the 1921 constitution' 2 and the 1974 constitution 3 require the
state to reserve mineral rights on the property it sells. Shell Oil Co. v.
Board of Commissioners of the Pontchartrain Levee District14 applied the
1921 constitution and held that a levee district was the "state" under
article IV, section 2, and that mineral rights must therefore be reserved on
property sold by that body. The First Circuit found these constitutional
provisions applicable notwithstanding an earlier decision of the Louisiana
9. See authorities cited in 340 So. 2d at 639-40.
10. LA. R.S. 31:66-67, 175-176 (Supp. 1974).
11. See, e.g., Recommendation No. 62 of the Expos6 Des Motifs entitled
Suggested Principles of Louisiana Mineral Law-A Basis for Reform, Louisiana
State Law Institute, George W. Hardy, III, Reporter, 1971.
12. La. Const. of 1921, art. IV, § 2.
13. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 4.
14. 336 So. 2d 248 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 338 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1976).
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Supreme Court in which the mineral reservation requirement had not been
applied to a school board. 15 Quoting the concurring opinion of then Judge
Tate in Rycade Oil Corp. v. Board of Commissioners,6 Judge Sartain
reasoned that levee boards are arms of the executive branch of state
government, and distinguished the school board decision on the ground
that school boards are "purely local subdivisions."' 7 The major conclu-
sion of an extensive review of levee district jurisprudence was that the
prior cases involved the deeding and sale of land prior to the 1921 adoption
of the Louisiana Constitution. Thus, the case at bar was res nova.
DESCRIPTION CLARITY AND THE PUBLIC RECORDS DOCTRINE
Valvoline Oil Co. v. Krauss 18 involved a divorce property settlement
which contained an omnibus description of certain tracts of land. Accord-
ing to the agreement each spouse recognized that property owned jointly
or separately would thereafter be owned by the party "in whose name the
title now stands, or is taken of record." Individual tracts were not specific-
ally described. The tract which was the subject of dispute in Valvoline had
been acquired by the husband while married. The Third Circuit Court of
Appeal, in a concursus suit, ruled in favor of a mineral lessor whose title
was derived from the ex-husband, rejecting the ex-wife's claim to the forty
acres. The court decided that the tract had stood in the husband's name,
and gave effect to the omnibus conveyance. Several decisions reflecting
the inadequacy of omnibus descriptions, such as "all property owned by
vendor" in a given parish, were distinguished, as relating only to prescrip-
tion or third party public records doctrine circumstances. 19 Here, the court
reasoned, the question was whether the conveyance was effective as to a
party to the transaction.
The decision was well justified by several precedents reviewed by the
court. Since the opinion applied relatively settled principles of sales law,
one might hesitate to review the case in a discussion of recent mineral
rights jurisprudence. However, the seemingly minor fact that the
controversy-a concursus-involved two mineral leases taken from ad-
verse claimants, raises interesting questions concerning the practical sig-
nificance to mineral transactions of rules which treat the original parties to
a transaction differently than third parties.
15. Stokes v. Harrison, 238 La. 343, 115 So. 2d 373 (1959).
16. 129 So. 2d 302, 305 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
17. 336 So. 2d at 253.
18. 335 So. 2d 64 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
19. See id. at 71-72.
[Vol. 38
WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1976-1977
The stimulation of dormant title claims often occurs in a mineral
leasing context. A mineral lessee of an apparent owner will often try to
protect his leasehold title by taking leases from remote claimants. Curious-
ly, the very taking of such a protection lease, as in the Valvoline case, is
the factual circumstance that may defeat the adverse title claim, if that
claim is by an original party to a transaction. Where there is a common
lessee of conflicting title claimants, as in the Valvoline case, the mineral
lessee is normally a neutral party, and will not assert the public records
doctrine. If the mineral lessee is not a neutral party, he will be apt to assert
his rights under article 18 of the Mineral Code, making the laws of registry
applicable. 20 Thus only if there were not a common lessee of two adverse
claimants would the laws of registry de facto govern. The question might
then arise, would the lease granted by a lessor who is not entitled to the
benefit of the laws of registry be ineffective as to the lessor, but effective
as to the lessee? That result would seem to be ordained by the reasoning in
Valvoline.
If this is so, tfe functional result is to give a kind of executive right to
a person who is not the true owner of mineral rights or land-a de facto
power to grant a mineral lease affecting the land or mineral rights of
another. 21 Indeed, the power is not limited to the granting of mineral
leases but might even involve conveyance of the whole ownership.
The attorney representing such a title claimant, with a de facto
executive right, can accidentally destroy his client's rights if he concurs in
a mineral lease which is silent as to the rule of article 121 of the Mineral
Code. That article authorizes the taking of protection leases. Prudent
landowner counsel will always seek explicitly to negate that article of the
Mineral Code and expressly to prohibit the taking of protection leases.
Otherwise, his client may end up a loser in a title litigation precipitated by
a mineral lessee, who may even add insult to injury by seeking refund of
the bonus paid for the lease. 22
THE LEASING OF REVERSIONARY INTERESTS
Article 144 of the Mineral Code modified the rules recognized in
prior jurisprudence interpreting the after-acquired title doctrine. Article
144 provides "that a mineral right that terminates during the existence of
the lease and becomes owned by the lessor or his successor in title, shall
20. LA. R.S. 31:18 (Supp. 1974).
21. See id. 31:105-113 (Supp. 1974).
22. See id. 31:120 (Supp. 1974) (warranty liability of mineral lessors).
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be subject to the lease. If the lease is filed for registry, the provision is
binding on all subsequent owners of the land or mineral rights leased." 
2 3
This binding effect on subsequent owners of the land is different from the
personal character of the obligation of warranty underlying pre-Mineral
Code after-acquired title jurisprudence. 24
A reading of the comments to articles 56, 144 and 145 suggests that
the problem attacked by article 144 was to clear the legal air of any
question of possible applicability of the old Hicks v. Clark25 prohibition
against dealing in reversionary interests. That rule was continued in the
prohibition of articles 76 and 104 against selling or reserving the expec-
tancy of extinction of a mineral servitude or royalty. Broader language of
the article 76 comment indicating that Hicks v. Clark provided that the
reversionary interest "is not an object of commerce" was not in fact used
in the text, which only explicitly prohibited sale or reservation of
reversionary interests, thus implicitly permitting leasing of reversionary
interests.
Thus, while the comments to articles 56, 144 and 145 point to
background that suggests that article 144 was designed for mineral leases
granted by a landowner to cover a reversionary interest, the actual text of
article 144 is not so limited. There is a reason. After-acquired title
circumstances could arise even where a purported servitude owner perfect-
ed a defective title to a servitude after transactions related thereto. There-
fore, there is a need for article 144 to apply to servitude owner leases. 26
Thus article 144 was presumably intended also to cover successors in title
of mineral servitude owners.
If the term "successor in title" in article 144 is viewed broadly to
include the party who acquires mineral rights upon the accrual of prescrip-
tion, then a servitude owner could grant a lease binding the landowner
after accrual of prescription. Considering that article 144 apparently was
intended to cover leases granted by servitude owners or claimants, there
would then arise a conflict with the purpose of article 144 as revealed in
the comments to the code-to permit a reversionary interest lease by a
landowner.
This problem was not clearly identified in Wahlder v. Roy 0. Martin
23. Id. 31:144 (Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
24. See cases discussed in comments to LA R.S. 31:144, 145 (Supp. 1974).
25. 225 La. 133, 72 So. 2d 322 (1954).
26. See LA. R.S. 31:77-79 (Supp. 1974) and cases discussed in comments
thereto.
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Lumber Co. ,27 where a mineral servitude had been outstanding and a
landowner granted a lease without warranty, but with the usual clause that
the lease would cover any reversionary mineral interests. The servitude
owner sued the landowner claiming the right to the bonus payment. After
the lease was granted, prescription accrued. Relying upon article 144, the
court rejected the claim.
It is submitted that article 144 was not intended to cover claims for
damages due to allegedly wrongful usurpations of others' property rights.
The purpose of article 144 was not to insulate lessors, but to protect
lessees, by securing their titles. This is not to quarrel with the result of the
decision, for a non-warranty lease can be likened unto a quit claim title,
which generally conveys only such right as the grantor has. To lease only
what you may have, if anything, should not constitute a cloud on another's
title. It is submitted that this is the real import of the decision-non-
liability to a true owner of mineral rights for mere leasing of such right as
one may have or thereafter acquire. Such a decision facilitates leasing and
development.
The case may be incorrectly construed to support the view that article
144 does not apply to leases granted by purported servitude owners, or that
a landowner is not a "successor in title" of a servitude owner. The case
did not truly reach these points, which are problems that await legislative
or judicial clarification.
CASES FOR FUTURE REFERENCE
In closing, two cases should be mentioned for future reference when
similar problems arise, though their holdings and analyses cannot now be
given extensive discussion: Forest Oil Corp. v. Superior Oil Co. , 2
8
interpreting an expenditure approval clause in a joint operating agreement;
and Succession of Rugg,2 9 reviewing and distinguishing mineral jurispru-
dence relative to the classification of mineral lease proceeds as rent and the
question whether they are fruits.
27. 337 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
28. 338 So. 2d 758 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
29. 339 So. 2d 519 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976), writ denied, 341 So. 2d 897 (La.
1977). This case posed the question of whether the proceeds of the sale of timber
rights comprised "fruits."
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